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NOTES AND COMMENTS
APPLYING THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE ON
A MORAL AND COMMERCIAL BASIS:
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC. V.
NATION ENTERPRISES*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the end of his term as President of the United
States, Gerald Ford entered into a contract with the publishing
company of Harper & Row and The Reader's Digest, Inc. for the
publication rights to the former President's memoirs, which were
still unwritten at that time.' For nearly two years Ford worked on
the memoirs with the assistance of a senior editor of Reader's Di-
gest Inc.2 Their work resulted in a "mountain of documents" and
over 6,000 pages of transcribed interviews involving Ford and other
parties.3 From this material a manuscript entitled A Time to Heal:
The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford was drafted. Just before the
completion of the memoirs, Harper & Row and Reader's Digest,
Inc. exercised their "first serial rights"'4 by entering into an agree-
ment with Time magazine. This agreement provided for Time to
pay $25,000 for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Ford's ac-
count of his pardon of former President Richard Nixon.5 Critical
terms of the agreement included a $12,500 advance with the re-
maining $12,500 payable at publication and Time's exclusive right
to the "first serial rights."6
* This note was awarded first place in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright
Competition at the University of Miami School of Law and has been submitted to the
national competition.
1. Harper & Row, Pub. v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (1985).
2. Harper & Row, Pub. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
3. Harper & Row, 577 F. Supp. at 1069 n.1.
4. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2222. "First serial rights" are the publishing trade's
definition of the exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts. Id.
5. Id. at 2222.
6. Id. In order to protect its exclusivity, Time "retained the right to renegotiate the
second payment should the material appear prior to its release of the excerpts." Id. Accord-
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An unauthorized copy of Ford's manuscript was secretly given
to Victor Navasky, the editor of The Nation magazine, two to
three weeks before Time's release was scheduled.7 With the knowl-
edge that his possession was unauthorized and believing that the
draft had to be returned quickly, Navasky hurriedly assembled a
draft of what he believed was "a real hot news story."8 The extent
of the work done by Navasky was to quote and paraphrase from
the memoirs, without any verification of the material and without
any editorial commentary.9 The Nation's article, entitled "The
Ford Memoirs-Behind the Nixon Pardon," was approximately
2,250 words and sets out former President Ford's recollections of
the facts concerning the pardon of Nixon as well as Ford's reminis-
cences about other national figures. 10 As a direct result of The Na-
tion's article appearing before Time's planned article, which was to
excerpt the same manuscript, Time exercised its right to cancel the
agreement. Under its agreement with Harper & Row and Reader's
Digest, Inc." Time refused to pay the balance of $12,500 due on
the agreement.12 Shortly after The Nation's article, former Presi-
dent Ford's memoirs, entitled "A Time to Heal," were official pub-
lished and protected by copyright."3
Consequently, Harper & Row and Reader's Digest brought an
action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York
alleging that The Nation's article was a copyright infringement
under the Copyright Act of 1976.1"
Harper & Row and Reader's Digest, Inc. also alleged conver-
sion and tortious interference with contract. The district court
found that the Ford memoirs were copyrightable and that The Na-
tion's article revealing the memoirs was "not such news, 'hot' or
otherwise, as to permit the use of author Ford's copyrighted mate-
rial""' under the "fair use" doctrine.' 6 In holding that the memoirs
ingly, Harper & Row took measures to protect the confidentiality of the transcript. Id.
7. Id. The identity of the person who took the manuscript as well as the circumstances
of the taking of the manuscript were not revealed. Id.
8. Id.
9. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1069.
10. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2221; Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. 1069. See also
Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2235-40 (setting out The Nation's article).
11. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2221.
12. Id.
13. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1069-70.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
15. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) codifying the four factors used by the courts in determining
"fair use"). See infra notes 50, 51 for a discussion of § 107.
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were copyrightable, the district court also found that although "re-
citals of historical facts, . . . the texts of government memoranda
prepared by individuals other than Ford, and. . . the quoted con-
versations of persons other than Ford' 1 7 were not per se copyright-
able, when the totality of the facts, memoranda and other conver-
sations were combined with Ford's recollections, this creative work
could be protected by the copyright laws. The district court
awarded Harper & Row and Reader's Digest, Inc. damages of
$12,500 resulting from Time's non-performance of the contract
plus any profits shown in a subsequent accounting."8 The state law
claims of conversion and tortious interference were dismissed as
being preempted under the Copyright Act. 9
On appeal, The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court's holding of copyright infringe-
ment and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the state law
claims of conversion and tortious interference.2 0 The basis of the
court of appeals' reversal began with its rejection of the district
court's coupling of copyrightable expression with uncopyrightable
facts into a copyrightable totality.2 ' The court of appeals then
found that large amounts of the information concerning Nixon's
pardon and the use of conversations attributed to other persons
were not copyrightable and thus not protected.22 After the un-
copyrighted material was "stripped away," the Second Circuit
found that The Nation's article contained, at most, 300 copy-
righted words.23 The court of appeals then held that the district
court was clearly erroneous in holding that The Nation's article
was not "fair use" of a news event.2 4 In doing so, the court of ap-
peals established an objective standard of what was news rather
than the subjective view which it perceived the district court as
establishing.2
The dissenting opinion for the court of appeals rejected the
17. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072.
18. Id. at 1073.
19. Harper & Row Pub. v. Nation Enterps. 723 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1983).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 205.
22. Id.
23. Id. These copyrighted words consisted of verbatim quotes which had not been in
any other publication, including "a short segment of Ford's conversations with Henry Kis-
singer and several other individuals" and primarily "Ford's impressionistic depictions of
Nixon, ill with phlebitis after the resignation and pardon, and of Nixon's character." Id. at
206.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 207.
19861
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majority's mechanical determination of what constitutes a "total-
ity" in lieu of a case-by-case approach.26 The dissent found that
although the district court was clearly erroneous in holding that
The Nation's article was not news, the article was still not a "fair
use."27 The dissent concluded that "The Nation... used far more
of the memoirs than was necessary to write a 'news' article. ' 28
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
decide the issue of whether the "fair use" doctrine, as codified in
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976,29 sanctioned "the unautho-
rized use of quotations from a public figure's unpublished manu-
script."30 Answering this question in the negative, the Supreme
Court held, reversed and remanded: A magazine's use of verbatim
excerpts from the unpublished manuscript of a public figure was
not a fair use. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
A. Constitutional Origin and Early Cases
The protection accorded under the copyright laws originates
from article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution: "The
Congress shall have Power. . .To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." 31 The intent of the Framers in providing this protection
was to encourage and reward creative individuals for their efforts.
Competing with the constitutional protection for copyright is
the first amendment guaranty of free speech: "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."3 2 The constitutional
tension resulting from the sometimes competing protections of
copyright and free speech has produced the idea-expression dichot-
omy. Under this dichotomy, an author's expressions of his ideas
are protected by copyright, while the ideas themselves are not.33 In
cases involving the idea-expression dichotomy, the critical issue be-
comes: what are an author's expressions and what are his ideas.
26. Id. at 214 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 215 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 216 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
30. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2221.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cls. 1 and 8.
32. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
33. 1 M. NIMmgs, NimzRI ON COPYMGHT 1.10 B.2 at 1-72 (1985).
f[Vol. 3:87
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The question of whether news could be an author's expression
was an early test of the idea-expression dichotomy. In an early
case, International News Service v. Associated Press,4 one news
gathering service alleged that a competing news service was taking
its news from bulletin boards and early editions of its members'
newspapers. The Supreme Court found that "the news element...
is not the creation of the writer." 35 The Supreme Court concluded
that constitutional protection of "history of the day" was not in-
tended by the framers of the Constitution and was thus not within
the protection of the copyright laws existing at that time.3
Even if there is an infringement of a work protected by copyright,
such infringement might be excused under the "fair use"
doctrine.3 7
The doctrine of fair use, originally created and articulated in
case law, permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copy-
right statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativ-
ity which that law is designed to foster. The cases emphasize
that resolution of a fair use claim "depends on an examination
of the facts in each case and cannot be determined by resort to
any arbitrary rules or fixed criteria."38
Among the earliest examples of this "judge-made rule of reason" 39
was in Folsom v. Marsh,40 which coincidentally involved the papers
of another former President, George Washington. In Folsom, it was
found that the infringers, in writing on the life of President Wash-
ington, used verbatim parts from a collection of Washington's let-
ters, which was published by the copyright holders."1 In doing so,
the defendants invaded the plaintiffs' copyright, despite there be-
ing no evidence of bad intentions on the part of the infringers. 2 In
his decision, Justice Story recognized the doctrine of "fair use."' 43
34. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
35. Id. at 234. Although International News Serv. was decided on grounds other than
copyright, it has been cited for the proposition that news by itself is not necessarily pro-
tected by copyright since the work did not originate with the author. 1 M. NIMMER, Supra
note 33, at 2.1 E. at 2-166.
36. 248 U.S. 215 at 234.
37. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 33, at 13.05.
38. Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60
(2d Cir. 1980). (citation omitted).
39. 3 M. NiMmER, supra note 33, at 13.05 B.2 at 13-62.
40. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
41. Id. at 345.
42. Id. at 349.
43. Id. at 345. Although Justice Story does not use the term "fair use," he was clearly
referring to the doctrine when he stated that, "it has been decided that a fair and bona fide
abridgment of an original work, is not a piracy of the copyright of the author." Id. (citations
19861
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as well as identifying the difficulty in its application: "But, then,
what constitutes a fair and bona fide abridgment, in the sense of
the law, is one of the most difficult points, under particular cir-
cumstances, which can well arise for judicial discussion."4"
B. Copyright Revision Act of 1976
The current statutory authority for copyright protection is the
Copyright Revision Act of 1976 (the Copyright Act). 5 The Copy-
right Act was enacted as a much heralded codification of the ex-
isting law.46 The subject matter of copyright protection is found in
section 102 of the Copyright Act 7 as well as in.the codification of
the idea-expression dichotomy.' 8 Section 106 sets forth the exclu-
sive rights which are vested in copyright owners.49
One of the most significant changes Congress made when re-
vising the copyright laws in 1976 was the codification of the "fair
use" doctrine in section 107. This "fair use" provision states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
omitted).
44. Id.
45. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 107 (1982).
46. "The general copyright revision of 1976 represented a towering achievement: the
first total recodification and modernization of copyright in sixty-seven years, which
culminated more than twenty years of study, debate, and drafting." Ladd, The Harm of the
Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 421, 423 (1983).
47. Section 102 provides that, "[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
48. 1. M. NIMMER, supra note 33, at 1.10 B.2 at 1-72. The codification of the "idea-
expression dichotomy" is found by combining the protection accorded in § 102(a) with the
limitation in § 102(b) which provides that "[iun no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
49. Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides that:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under the title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies... to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary... works, to display the copyrighted work
publicly.
17. U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
[Vol. 3:87
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for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.50
After defining and codifying the "fair use" doctrine, section 107
sets out four factors to be used in determining whether or not a
given use is a "fair use:"
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particu-
lar case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for a
value of the copyrighted work.51
Although the Copyright Act gives some guidance in determin-
ing "fair use," its drafters recognized the difficulty of its applica-
tion encountered by the courts ever since Folsom v. Marsh,5 2 :
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use
doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept
has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule
of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each
case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.58
Because of the difficulty in formulating a concrete statutory "fair
use" standard, the drafters specifically provided that: "[slection
107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use,
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.""
C. Bad Faith and Fair Use
In order for an individual to utilize the "fair use" doctrine, a
commentator suggested and the courts have borne out an element
of good faith in its use.55 The early leading case on the good faith
element, Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates6 involved the Za-
50. 17. U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
51. Id.
52. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
53. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5679.
54. Id. at 66, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5680.
55. See W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIvILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 121-23 (1985).
56. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This case was prior to the Copyright Revision
19861
7
Lustig: Applying the Fair Use Doctrine on a Moral and Commercial Basis: <
Published by Institutional Repository, 1986
94 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
pruder film of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
This film, "an historic document and undoubtedly the most impor-
tant photographic evidence concerning the fatal shots,"57 was pur-
chased by Life magazine, which printed pieces of the film in sev-
eral copyrighted issues of its magazine. One of the defendants in
the action was the author of an analytical book on the Kennedy
assassination which included sketches of frames of the Zapruder
film." These sketches were drawn from copies made by the in-
fringing author from some of the Zapruder frames, while the in-
fringer was a consultant with Life. Because "Life had refused per-
mission to use the Zapruder frames in the defendant's Book,"5 9 the
copying was improper and the fact that sketches were used rather
than actual copies did not dissuade the court from the position
that copying had indeed occurred." The so-called 'sketches' in the
Book ... are in fact copies, as is readily apparent by comparison
with the Zapruder frames involved .... The 'artist' has simply
copied the original in charcoal with no creativity or originality
whatever."60
In holding that the infringing author's copying of the Za-
pruder film was a "fair use" the court found that, "[t]here is an
initial reluctance to find any fair use by defendants because of the
deliberate appropriation in the Book, in defiance of the copyright
owner. Fair use presupposes 'good faith and fair dealing.' "61 With
this indicia of bad faith, the court balanced the facts in favor of
the defendants:
On the other hand it was not the nighttime activities of [the
defendant author] which enabled defendants to reproduce cop-
ies of Zapruder frames in the Book. They could have secured
such frames from the National Archives, or they could have used
the reproductions in the Warren Report or in the issues of Life
itself. 2
When the court balanced these factors along with the importance
of the public's interest in receiving the fullest information on the
Kennedy assasination, the court found that the defendants' use
was fair. 3
Act of 1976 and therefore did not apply the § 107 factors.
57. Id. at 131.
58. Id. at 131-32.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 139.
61. Id. at 146. (citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. The court also considered several commercial factors, which will be discussed
[Vol. 3:87
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Public interest will not always overcome bad faith. Iowa State
University Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting Co."'
involved a short film on a college wrestler who later became a gold
medal winner at the 1972 Olympics. This film was produced by two
students and financed by their university's research foundation
and the wrestler's family.6 The university and one of the produc-
ers had a written agreement which allowed the producer to negoti-
ate the first television showing, but this was only to be expressly
with the university's consent."6 This agreement was displayed in a
legend on the film.6 7 The film's producer negotiated with the in-
fringing television network, with whom he was temporarily em-
ployed. An agreement, however, was never reached. Despite this
lack of agreement, the network made an unauthorized copy and
used short portions of the film in three separate broadcasts. The
network never paid any compensation and repeatedly denied its
use of the film to the university.68
In affirming the district court's holding that the copying of the
film was a copyright infringement not excused by the "fair use"
doctrine, the court of appeals rejected the network's argument as
to the importance and public benefit of the film's subject matter.
The court of appeals was especially concerned with the network's
conduct:
The fair use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empow-
ering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the
underlying work contains material of possible public impor-
tance. Indeed, we do not suppose that appellants would embrace
their own defense theory if another litigant sought to apply it to
the ABC evening news.6'
D. Commercial Use and the Sony Case
Under the "fair use" doctrine, prior to the Copyright Revision
Act of 1976, the courts had considered the commercial nature of
infra at notes 70-71.
64. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980), affg 463 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Although the
case was tried after the enactment of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, the judicial doc-
trine of "fair use" was applied rather than the section 107 factors because the events which
led to the action were prior to the effective date of the Copyright Act. Id. at 60 n.5.
65. Id. at 58.
66. Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Co. 463 F. Supp. 902
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
67. Id. at 905.
68. 621 F.2d at 59.
69. Id. at 61.
19861
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the questioned use in deciding "fair use" issue. In Time Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Associates, the infringing author's lack of commer-
cial incentive was a key factor in the court's finding of a "fair use":
Moreover, while hope by a defendant for commercial gain is not
a significant factor in this Circuit, there is a strong point for
defendants in their offer to surrender to Life [the plaintiff] all
profits of Associates [one of the defendants] from the Book as
royalty payment for a license to use the copyrighted Zapruder
frames. 70
Furthermore, the court found that the copyright holder and in-
fringers did not complete, and "[ilt seems more reasonable to spec-
ulate that the Book would, if anything, enhance the value of the
copyrighted work; it is difficult to see any decrease in its value."'7'
Similarly, the court in Iowa State University Research Foun-
dation v. American Broadcasting Cos. looked into the commercial
effect of the infringing network's actions on the copyright holder:
[W]e believe that ABC did foreclose a significant potential mar-
ket to Iowa-sale of its film for use on television in connection
with the Olympics. In fact, because of its exclusive right to tele-
vise the games, ABC monopolized that market. When ABC tele-
cast [the copied film] without purchasing the film it usurped an
extremely significant market.71
Thus, in determining "fair use," the courts have given great impor-
tance to the commercial relationship between the copyright hold-
ers and the infringers, and as between these parties and their re-
spective commercial markets.
The commercial nature of the use of a copyrighted work is ex-
pressly provided for in the Copyright Revision Act of 1976'3 as a
factor to be analyzed in determining "fair use." The landmark case
of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios74 is an example of the Su-
preme Court's recent approach to commercial practices. Sony (the
so-called "Betamax Case"), was an action brought by the copy-
right owners of certain television programs against the manufac-
turers and sellers of home video tape recorders. At issue was
whether "the sale of defendants' copying equipment to the general
public violate[d] any of the rights conferred upon plaintiffs by the
70. 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
71. Id. at 146.
72. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., 621 F.2d at 62.
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982).
74. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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Copyright Act."175 The copyright owners did not take any action
against any of the video tape recorder owners, but rather brought
the action against the defendants, alleging that they, because of
their manufacturing and marketing of the recorders, were liable for
alleged copyright infringement by recorder owners. 76
The district court held that, "noncommercial home use record-
ing of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of
copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringe-
ment.1 77 The district court further held that the defendants could
not be liable for contributory infringement even if the recorder
owners were infringing.7 In doing so, the district court reasoned
that if marketers of the video tape recorders could be liable for
their customers' infringements, so might the marketers of "other
staple articles of commerce" such as cameras, tape recorders, and
copying machines. 79
The court of appeals reversed, holding that home use of the
video tape recorder was not a "fair use" because it was not a pro-
ductive use. The court of appeals also rejected the analogy to sta-
ple articles of commerce by distinguishing tape recorders and pho-
tocopying from video tape recorders. The distinction was that tape
recorders and photocopying machines have substantial benefit
while video tape recorders' primary purpose is reproducing copy-
righted television programs. The court of appeals held that the de-
fendants were chargeable with the recorder owners' infringing use
since that was the most conspicuous or major use.80
The decision of the court of appeals was reversed by the Su-
preme Court. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court first
found that, "It]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringe-
ment if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed it need merely be capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses." 81 Justice Stevens then went on to rephrase the issue
as whether the video tape recorder was capable of "commercially
significant noninfringing uses." 2 The Court found that the video
tape recorder was capable of a noncommercial significant use,
75. Id. at 420.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 425.
78. Id. at 426.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 427-28.
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"time-shifting," which is where a video tape recorder is used to
record a program which cannot be viewed at the televised time.
Justice Stevens reasoned that because "time-shifting" was a non-
commercial significant noninfringing use, it was a fair use.8 3 This
private, noncommercial use may be either authorized, for example,
in sports or educational broadcasting where the producers author-
ize home taping84 or unauthorized, such as with the removal of
commercial advertisements from programs. The unauthorized
"time shifting" would also be a "fair use" because it necessarily
involves noncommercial, nonprofit activity 5 and there was no
showing of any "meaningful likelihood of future harm" to the
copyright holders.8e
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Moral Basis
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court again addressed the
"fair use" doctrine in a commercial setting along with the addi-
tional element of bad faith. Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor focused on Navasky's knowledge that his possession of
the "purloined manuscript" was unauthorized.8 7 Although the
court did not specifically state that The Nation through its editor
acted in bad faith, the court examined The Nation's conduct and
found a lack of good faith.
The trial court found that The Nation knowingly exploited a
purloined manuscript .... Unlike the typical claim of fair use,
The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justifi-
cation. Like its competitor newsweekly, it was free to bid for the
right of abstracting excerpts from "A Time to Heal." Fair use
"distinguishes between a true scholar and a chiseler who in-
fringes a work for personal profit." 88
Thus, the Court subjectively examined the infringer's conduct in
comparison to its competitors by using the customary practices of
that industry. In the publishing industry, the customary commer-
cial practice for excerpting a soon-to-be-released book appears to
83. Id.
84. Id. at 446.
85. Id. at 449.
86. Id. at 451.
87. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (1985). Pur-
loined has been defined as "appropriate wrongfully and often under circumstances that in-
volve a breach of trust." WaSsmS Tmred NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1846 (1976).
88. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2232.
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be through bidding rather than by "appropriating" a "purloined"
manuscript. When The Nation's lack of adherence to customary
standards is combined with the Court's use of terms such as "ap-
propriate" and "purloined," the result is a lack of moral good faith
on the part of The Nation. This, in the majority's view, is decid-
edly different than the dissent's view that bad faith means illegal
or criminal conduct.8 9
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor rejected The Nation's attempt
to use the first amendment to justify its conduct:
[The Nation] advance[s] the substantial public import of the
subject matter of the Ford Memoirs as grounds for excusing a
use that would ordinarily not pass muster as a fair use-the
piracy of verbatim quotations for the purpose of "scooping" the
authorized first serialization. [The Nation] explain[s] [its] copy-
ing of Mr. Ford's expression as essential to reporting the news
story it claims the book itself represents .... [The Nation] at-
gue[s] that the public's interest in learning the news as fast as
possible outweighs the right of the author to control its first
publication."
In rejecting this rationale, the Court reasoned that The Nation's
argument would create a bright line rule that would effectively ex-
pand the "fair use" doctrine "to create what amounts to a public
figure exception to copyright." 91 Instead, the Court focused on The
Nation's bad faith and applied the section 107 "fair use" factors to
find that The Nation's use was not fair.2
The Court's handling of The Nation's bad faith was consistent
with the doctrine previously developed in the lower courts.93
Harper & Row, like Bernard Geis, dealt with an important histori-
cal event. However, whereas Bernard Geis dealt with a new theory
of analysis on the assassination of John F. Kennedy, using frames
of the copyrighted Zapruder film which had already been pub-
fished, Harper & Row involved an unpublished copyrighted autobi-
ography which was to be excerpted by a magazine competing with
The Nation. In Bernard Geis, if the offending use of the frames
was not allowed, the public arguably would not have been exposed
89. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2240 (Brennan, White, Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2228.
91. Id. at 2230.
92. Id. at 2231-35. For application of the § 107 "fair use" factors, see infra notes 104-
18.
93. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57
(2d Cir. 1980); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); W. PA-
TRY, THE FAIR USE PmvIzEz IN COPYRIGHT LAw 121-23 (1985).
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to the new theory. But, in Harper & Row the only thing that the
public gained by The Nation's unauthorized use of the manuscript
was a preview, using verbatim quotes and paraphrasing of the Ford
manuscript, which was to be excerpted soon thereafter. The public
gained no new or additional knowledge, because The Nation's edi-
tor added little, if any, editorial commentary. This distinction,
based on public flow of information, goes to the very root of copy-
right protection: "[T]he Framers intended copyright ... to be the
engine of free expression. 95 In Bernard Geis, strict adherence to
copyright would have prevented the author's free expression of a
new theory of analysis. Copyright was, however, necessary to pro-
tect President Ford's free expression of thoughts. Without the pro-
tection of copyright, Ford's memoirs would not be marketable and
his thoughts would probably never be published.
Comparatively, however, The Nation's misconduct was not as
injurious as the conduct of the television network's in Iowa State
University Research Foundation. In Harper & Row, there was no
deception or denial involving the use of the manuscript, as the net-
work did in the use of the film." Also, rather than one competitor
trying to gain a competitive advantage over another by "scooping"
the manuscript as was done in Harper & Row, Iowa State Univer-
sity Research Foundation involved a large corporate network
stealing a film produced by amateur students. 7 Despite these dis-
tinctions, The Nation's use was not held to be a "fair use." Thus,
when there is bad faith present on the part of the user, a balancing
test is used within the statutory framework. The determination of
bad faith is done subjectively, using the infringer's conduct in com-
parison with the customary standards of the infringer's industry.
The results are that the greater the degree of bad faith, the lesser
are the chances of the use being held fair.
B. The Commercial Basis
The Court's decision was also deeply rooted in commercial
practices. The most significant of the commercial practices was the
right of first publication
First publication is inherently different from other § 106 rights
in that only one person can be the first publisher; as the con-
tract with Time illustrates, the commercial value of the right lies
94. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
95. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2230.
96. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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primarily in exclusivity. Because the potential damage to the au-
thor from judicially enforced "sharing" of the first publication
right with unauthorized users of this manuscript is substantial,
the balance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair use in-
evitably shifts.98
Clearly, The Nation's unauthorized use of the unpublished Ford
manuscript infringed on the first publication rights which were
contracted for by Time.
The Nation argued that "the public's interest in learning this
news as fast as possible outweighs the right of the author to con-
trol its first publication." '9 9 This contention was rejected by the
Court. Instead, the Court chose the "idea/expression dichotomy" 100
and the traditional equities of fair use"'1 1 as the proper standards
by which to judge The Nation's use of Harper & Row's copy-
righted material.
The Court's rejection of The Nation's attempt to characterize
the expressions comprising the Ford manuscript as non-copyright-
able news was also based on its concern for the way that commer-
cial incentives foster the dissemination of information under copy-
right. In rejecting The Nation's argument the Court held:
[The Nation's] theory ... would expand fair use to effectively
destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the work of a
public figure. Absent such protection, there would be little in-
centive to create or profit in financing such memoirs and the
public would be denied an important source of significant histor-
ical information. The promise of copyright would be an empty
one if it could be avoided merely by dubbing the infringement a
fair use "news report" of the book ...
In our haste to disseminate the news, it should not be for-
gotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the en-
gine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the
use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incen-
tive to create and disseminate ideas.'
An additional commercial reason used by the Court was the
investment of time and capital by Ford and Harper & Row. Justice
O'Connor stated "[w]here an author and publisher have invested
98. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2227.
99. Id. at 2228.
100. Id. at 2228-29. For a discussion of the "idea/expression dichotomy" see supra
note 33.
101. 105 S. Ct. at 2231.
102. Id. at 2229-30 (citation omitted).
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extensive resources in creating an original work and are poised to
release it to the public, no legitimate aim is served by preempting
the right of first publication." ' The Ford manuscript was the re-
sult of two years of extensive work, 104 whereas The Nation's article
was one weekend of quoting and paraphrasing by its editor.10 5 The
Nation could have added or improved the article, thus giving it
some investment or contribution in the article. In that situation,
The Nation certainly would have had a greater chance of qualify-
ing as a "fair use." However, The Nation's bad faith in its use of
the "purloined" manuscript only served to emphasize the maga-
zine's lack of contribution to the article. As a result of the policies
underlying the commercial practices, the Court articulated a pre-
sumptive test: "Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right
to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated ex-
pression will outweigh a claim of fair use.9106
Perhaps Justice O'Connor's view on the effect of commercial
practices is best illustrated by comparing Harper & Row with the
Sony case. In the Sony case the Court was willing to expand the
"fair use" doctrine in light of changes in technology, i.e. the advent
of video tape recorders. In doing so the Court recognized not only
commercial uses but also non-commercial uses such as "time-shift-
ing.910 7 Thus, the Court not only looks at commercial uses and
practices but also at noncommercial uses where significant, as in
the Sony case. In Harper & Row, however, there were no signifi-
cant noncommercial reasons to permit The Nation to use the Ford
manuscript. Clearly the purpose of The Nation's "scooping" of the
103. Id. at 2229.
104. See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. An interesting contrast between the
approaches taken in Harper & Row by the district court and the court of appeals is reflected
by their respective characterizations of the work on the article by The Nation's editor. The
district court found that:
[The editor] spent overnight or perhaps the next twenty-four hour period quot-
ing and paraphrasing from a number of sections of the memoirs [the editor]
added no comment of his own. He did not check the material ... Part of [the
editor's] rush apparently was caused by the fact that he had to get the draft
back to his "source" with some speed.
557 F. Supp. at 1069 (emphasis added).
Conversely, the court of appeals characterized the editor's work as follows:
Believing the book to contain important political news, including heretofore un-
disclosed facts on the pardon, [the editor] worked frenetically throughout a
night and part of a weekend to read the memoirs in their entirety and select
materials germane to a news article before returning the copy to its source.
723 F.2d at 198 (emphasis added).
106. 105 S. Ct. at 2228.
107. For a discussion of "time-shifting" see supra note 80 nd accompanying text.
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article from Time was for an eventual financial award, which cer-
tainly is a commercial goal. 0 8
C. Application of the Section 107 Fair Use Factors
After addressing the relevance of the good faith test and com-
mercial uses, Justice O'Connor summarily applied the section 107
statutory factors'09 to the facts of Harper & Row in order to deter-
mine whether or not the infringement was a "fair use."
1. Purpose of the Use
The Court found that although the purpose was to report
news, "The Nation went beyond reporting uncopyrighted informa-
tion and actively sought to exploit the headline value of its in-
fringement, making a 'news event' out of its unauthorized first
publication of a noted figure's copyrighted expression."" 0 Under
this factor, Justice O'Connor also took The Nation's bad faith and
its achieved purpose of "supplanting the copyright holder's com-
mercially valuable right of first publication" ' into account.
Clearly, analysis under this first factor did not form a finding of
"fair use."
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The Court recognized that because A Time to Heal was an
autobiography, some quotes may have been necessary to ade-
quately convey the facts. However, The Nation clearly crossed the
threshold when it "excerpted subjective descriptions and portraits
of public figures whose power laid in the author's individualized
expression. ' "2 Within this second factor, Justice O'Connor applied
the presumptive test favoring the copyright holder of unpublished
material. 13 Using this test, the Court found that the use by The
Nation clearly infringed upon Harper & Row's interest in the con-
fidentiality of the manuscript, and that The Nation did not over-
108. Ironically, The Nation only received $418.00 in newsstand sales from the infring-
ing issue. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 198. The Supreme Court gave no recognition to this
nominal revenue.
109. See supra note 50 for a discussion of the four factors.
110. 105 S. Ct. at 2231.
111. Id. at 2232 (citation omitted).
112. Id.
113. For a discussion of the presumptive test, see Supra note 100 and accompanying
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come the presumption of no "fair use" within this second factor. 114
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Under this third factor, the Court combined the district
court's subjective finding that The Nation took the "heart of the
book"' " with the court of appeals' "stripped away" thirteen per-
cent of verbatim quotes,116 and found that the qualitative feature
of the amount used made the taking something more than mea-
ger.117 In doing so, the Court looked beyond the solely mechanical,
quantitative test developed by the court of appeals.
4. Effect on the Market
Justice O'Connor viewed this last factor as the "single most
important element of fair use."' 18 The Court found that there
clearly was an effect on the market as a result of the infringement;
the effect being Time's cancellation of the contract." 9 The Court
also took account of the potential market effect if the infringement
were to become widespread. 20 Justice O'Connor found that there
was a potential market effect: "A fair use doctrine that permits
extensive prepublication quotations from an unreleased manu-
script without the copyright owner's consent poses substantial po-
tential for damage to the marketability of first serialization rights
in general.' 2'
After the Court applied the four section 107 factors, Justice
O'Connor held that The Nation's infringement of the approxi-
114. Harper and Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2233.
115. 557 F. Supp. at 1072. This heart was the material on the pardon of Richard
Nixon. Id. at 1072 n.10.
116. Thirteen percent is calculated by dividing the approximately 300 "stripped away"
copyrighted words by the approximately 2,250 words in The Nation article. See Harper &
Row, 723 F.2d at 198, 206.
117. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2234.
118. Id. Justice O'Connor's view is based in part on an economic theory. Justice
O'Connor stated:
Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use exception should
come into play only in those situations in which the market fails or the price the
copyright holder would ask is near zero.... As the facts here demonstrate, there
is a fully functioning market that encourages the creation and dissemination of
memoirs of public figures. In the economists' view, permitting "fair use" to dis-
place normal copyright channels disrupts the copyright market without a com-
mensurate public benefit.
Id. at n.9 (citations omitted).
119. Id. See supra note 6 for a discussion at the agreement with Time.
120. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2234-35.
121. Id. at 2235.
[Vol. 3:87
18
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 5
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol3/iss1/5
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC.
mately 300 words of verbatim quotations was an infringement not
excused by the "fair use" doctrine. 12 2 The issue of the combination
of copyrightable elements with uncopyrightable elements was spe-
cifically not addressed, because Justice O'Connor felt it was unnec-
essary in view of The Nation's conceded use of 300 verbatim
words. 123
D. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Brennan found that The Nation's use
was fair.124 Justice Brennan viewed the Court's decision as favoring
the copyright owner at the expense of the underlying rationale for
copyright protection:
[T]his zealous defense of the copyright owner's prerogative will,
I fear, stifle the broad dissemination of ideas and information
copyright is intended to nurture. Protection of the copyright
owner's economic interest is achieved in this case through an ex-
ceedingly narrow definition of the scope of fair use. The progress
of arts and sciences and the robust public debate essential to an
enlightened citizenry are ill served by this constricted reading of
the fair use doctrine. 12 5
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the Court on whether or not
The Nation acted in bad faith:
The Court's reliance on The Nation's putative bad faith is
equally unwarranted. No court has found that The Nation pos-
sessed the Ford manuscript illegally or in violation of any com-
mon law interest of Harper & Row. . .. Even if the manuscript
had been "purloined" by someone, nothing in the record im-
putes culpability to The Nation. On the basis of the record in
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2224-25.
Perhaps the controversy between the lower courts in this case over copyright-
ability is more aptly styled a dispute over whether The Nation's appropriation of
unoriginal and uncopyrightable elements encroached on the originality embodied
in the work as a whole.
We need not reach these issues, however, as The Nation has admitted to lifting
verbatim quotes of the author's original language totalling between 300 and 400
words and constituting some 13% of The Nation article. In using verbatim ex-
cerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript to lend authenticity to its account
of the forthcoming memoirs, The Nation effectively arrogated to itself the right
of first publication, an important marketable subsidiary right.
Id.
124. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2240 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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this case, the most that can be said is that The Nation made use
of the contents of the manuscript knowing the copyright owner
would not sanction the use. 26
However, contrary to Justice Brennan's bright line test of illegal
versus legal, the Court's test of bad faith is a subjective one. The
Court's subjective approach seems more appropriate since the rele-
vancy of the bad faith is in determining the infringer's intent in its
purpose and use of the copyrighted materials. 2 7
IV. CONCLUSION
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court justifiably refused to
expand the "fair use" doctrine, as it had in the Sony case.
The "fair use" exception in the Sony case was a result of a
new technology together with significant noncommercial uses. The
infringement in Harper & Row resulted from a magazine's bad
faith use of a soon-to-be-released manuscript, which was to be ex-
cerpted by a rival magazine. The determination of bad faith is
done on a subjective, moral basis, using customary commercial
practices as the benchmark. The application of the statutory "fair
use" factors is only one of the bases of analysis used by the Court,
with other tests such as moral good faith also being employed.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Harper & Row is the
Court's concern that if The Nation's infringement was allowed as a
"fair use," public figures might be discouraged from writing their
memoirs. This is because publishers would not be willing to pay as
much for the memoirs when the memoirs could be taken and pub-
lished by a rival who only makes minor changes. Not only would a
"fair use" holding adversely affect the commercial publishing in-
dustry, it would certainly be contrary to one of the underlying pur-
poses of copyright which is to encourage the creation of literary
works.
Eric A. Lustig*
126. Id. at 2248 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982). See supra note 104 for use of the infringer's bad
faith in statutory analysis.
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